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Strange Bedfellows
 The Convergence of Sovereignty-Limiting Doctrines in 
Counterterrorist and Human Rights Discourse
Rosa Brooks
It is hard to imagine two groups with less in common than 
national security hawks and human rights activists. They 
represent different cultures with different views on the use 
of force, the role of rights, and the constraining power of 
international law. Yet despite their differences, the two 
groups seem to be converging on an understanding of state 
sovereignty as limited and subject to de facto waiver—an 
understanding that appears to legitimize military inter-
ventions even in the absence of state consent and Security 
Council authorization. 
This convergence is reached via different routes in each 
community: for the national security community, counter-
terrorism provides the sovereignty-limiting logic, while for 
the human rights and humanitarian law communities, it is 
the prevention of atrocities that leads to sovereignty-limiting 
doctrines. 
The convergence is surprising. The human rights and 
humanitarian law communities and the national security 
community have historically differed in their views of the 
centrality of national interests versus the centrality of inter-
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national institutions, laws, and norms. 
They have also held different views on 
the legitimacy and desirability of the 
use of armed force to solve problems. 
The national security community tends 
to view international law as a politi-
cal constraint, but not a significant 
legal constraint, and sees the use (or at 
least the credible threat) of force as an 
essential means of protecting national 
interests and promoting global security. 
The human rights and humanitarian 
law communities come from a differ-
ent tradition, tending to regard the 
narrow protection of national inter-
ests as inimical to the establishment 
of a strong and normatively legitimate 
international system, one that protects 
rights through law, rather than force. 
In this tradition, the use of force is 
viewed as an occasionally unavoidable 
necessity that should be tightly con-
trolled by international law.
Despite these differences, as the 
human rights and humanitarian law 
communities grapple with the problem 
of atrocity prevention, and the national 
security community grapples with the 
challenges posed by transnational ter-
rorism, the two have arrived at strikingly 
similar legal theories about sovereignty, 
intervention, and the use of force. 
Specifically, both the human rights and 
humanitarian law and the counter-ter-
rorism/national security law discourses 
have come to rely increasingly on the 
view that sovereignty is less a right but 
a privilege—a privilege that is effectively 
waived by states that fail to fulfill their 
sovereign responsibilities, and when 
waived, entitles other states to lawfully 
use military force on the territory of the 
“waiving” state.  
This convergence of sovereignty-
limiting doctrines is partial and uneasy, 
but to the extent that it further opens 
the door to the use of force on the 
territories of non-consenting states, 
it poses significant challenges—both to 
the stability of the always-shaky inter-
national order, and to the convictions 
and traditions of the human rights and 
humanitarian communities.  
In this essay, I want to trace how this 
convergence has come about in two 
very different discourse communities, 
and point out some of the unintended 
consequences and unresolved problems 
that result.
Sovereignty-Limiting Doc-
trines in the Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law Com-
munities. Start with human rights 
and humanitarian law discourse. It has 
become a truism to proclaim that West-
phalian sovereignty is on its deathbed, 
weakened first by the UN Charter and 
the emergence of human rights law, and 
now virtually eviscerated by globaliza-
tion. For the human rights commu-
nity, the big story is about the decline 
of the state as the primary subject of 
international law. Over a period of less 
than a hundred years, international 
law has ceased to be solely a matter of 
the rights and duties of states vis-à-
vis other states—individuals also have 
entered the international law picture. 
The UN Charter spoke of fundamen-
tal human rights, and these were soon 
elaborated in numerous UN resolu-
tions and international human rights 
treaties. Increasingly, states have begun 
to accept that human rights law lim-
its their internal sovereignty: after the 
Holocaust, few were willing to advance 
the position that states could do what-
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ever they wished inside their own bor-
ders. What is more, international law 
began to give states obligations to act 
to prevent human rights abuses inside 
the territory of other states: under the 
Genocide Convention, for instance, 
states “undertake to prevent and to 
punish” genocide.1 
By the mid-1990s, a range of increas-
ingly robust sovereignty-limiting insti-
tutions and efforts were emerging as 
a result of the human rights revolu-
tion. Some were judicial, such as the 
international criminal tribunals for 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the Inter-
national Criminal Court. Others were 
political: the wars in the former Yugo-
slavia and the Rwandan genocide led 
to a growing international willingness 
to view humanitarian intervention as 
legitimate, at least under limited cir-
cumstances. In the former Yugoslavia, 
NATO’s intervention—though half-
hearted and belated—occurred with UN 
Security Council blessing.2 
Even in the post-Cold War world 
and when faced with the most egregious 
of circumstances, however, the Secu-
rity Council could not necessarily be 
relied upon to authorize humanitar-
ian interventions. During the Rwandan 
genocide, the looming threat of vetoes 
helped preclude meaningful Security 
Council action, and the same was true 
during the Kosovo crisis. In Kosovo, 
though, when ethnic cleansing seemed 
imminent, the NATO states opted 
for military intervention even in the 
absence of Security Council authoriza-
tion. NATO’s justification was funda-
mentally extralegal in nature: it rested, 
in effect, on a claim of moral necessity.3 
The intervention likely saved thou-
sands of lives, and was given a form 
of post hoc validation in subsequent 
Security Council resolutions.4 Still, the 
legal and moral dilemma was acute. In 
a 1999 speech, then-UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan spelled it out: 
State sovereignty, in its most basic 
sense, is being redefined-not 
least by the forces of globalization 
and international cooperation. 
States are now widely understood 
to be instruments at the service 
of their peoples, and not vice 
versa...When we read the [UN] 
Charter today, we are more than 
ever concious that its aim is to 
protect individual human beings, 
not to protect those who abuse 
them. The genocide in Rwanda 
showed us how terrible the con-
sequences of inaction can be…
But this year’s conflict in Kosovo 
raised equally important ques-
tions…5 
By the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, the 1990s’ debates over human-
itarian intervention had morphed 
into discussion of the “Responsibil-
ity to Protect” (R2P), a doctrine ini-
tially developed by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS). ICISS offered a 
starkly different understanding of sov-
ereignty than that taken for granted 
prior to World War II: 
State sovereignty implies respon-
sibility…Where a population 
is suffering serious harm, as a 
result of internal war, insurgency, 
repression or state failure, and 
the state in question is unwill-
ing or unable to halt or avert it, 
the principle of non-interven-
tion yields to the international 
responsibility to protect.6 
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ICISS was careful to note that mili-
tary force should be a last resort, and 
that any military interventions should be 
authorized by the Security Council. But 
ICISS was unwilling to view Security 
Council authorization as an absolute 
requirement: 
“If the Security Council rejects 
a proposal [to intervene to protect 
a population] or fails to deal with 
it in a reasonable time, alternative 
options…[include] action within 
area of jurisdiction by regional or 
sub-regional organizations under 
Chapter VIII of the Charter, sub-
ject to their seeking subsequent 
authorization.”
 After all, if the Council “fails to 
discharge its responsibility to protect in 
conscience-shocking situations crying 
out for action,” warned ICISS, “con-
cerned states may not rule out other 
means to meet the gravity and urgency 
of that situation…”7  
Within a decade, both the United 
States and the UN had offered R2P 
at least a lukewarm embrace. In 2011, 
the Security Council referenced R2P 
in Resolution 1973, which authorized 
the use of force to protect civilians in 
Libya, and in Resolution 1975, autho-
rizing the use of force in Cote d’Ivoire.8 
For the human rights and humanitar-
ian law communities, the trend towards 
sovereignty-limiting doctrines pre-
mised on human rights had reached 
its apotheosis. Though R2P’s implied 
willingness to dispense with Security 
Council authorization has not been put 
to the test, it is difficult to doubt that 
if another Kosovo-like situation arose, 
concerned states might well take matters 
into their own hands.9 
Back to the National Security 
Community. Turning back now to 
the national security community, we 
see a parallel trend. Only two months 
before ICISS issued its initial report on 
R2P, the terrorist attacks of September 
2011 shook up traditional notions of 
sovereignty, self-defense, and armed 
conflict. 
Prior to 9/11, most states accepted 
(publicly, at least) the general inter-
national law principle that force could 
not be used inside the territory of 
a sovereign state unless the state at 
issue consented, the Security Council 
had authorized the use of force under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or the 
use of force was in self-defense follow-
ing an “armed attack,” as delineated in 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. Standard 
interpretations of the right to self-
defense included the right to use force 
to prevent an “imminent” attack, but 
the idea of imminence was construed 
narrowly.10 
UN Charter provisions on the use of 
force rest firmly on traditional under-
standings of sovereignty: as long as a 
state refrained in its external actions 
from threatening other states, the use 
of force inside the territory of a non-
consenting sovereign state would be 
unlawful.11  If a state chose to develop 
or harbor terrorists, this was its own 
business; unless terrorists carried out 
attacks beyond its borders, no other 
state had a legal basis to use force inside 
the “harboring” state. 
Though this principle was some-
times more honored in the breach, it 
remained relatively unquestioned by 
states until the 9/11 attacks. But 9/11 
made glaringly apparent a trend that 
had been underway for decades: glo-
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balization—and accompanying changes 
in transportation, communication and 
weapons technologies—had democra-
tized the means of mass destruction, 
reduced the salience of international 
borders, and accelerated the speed with 
which money and materiel could travel.
Inevitably, these changes under-
mined the logic of sovereign non-inter-
vention principles. Within the national 
security community, counterterrorism 
concerns sparked the rapid emergence 
of both normative and legal arguments 
for expanding the basis for using force 
within the territory of other states. 
There were generally two strands 
to these arguments. First, the tradi-
tional self-defense-based justification 
for using force was expanded, most 
strikingly in the Bush Administration’s 
embrace of so-called “preemptive” self-
defence, which was used to justify the 
war in Iraq.12 The logic underlying the 
Bush argument was straigt forward. In 
the age of ballistic missiles and nuclear, 
chemical, and biological threats, states 
may only have a moment’s notice before 
an imminent attack. Surely the fram-
ers of the UN Charter would not have 
required states to wait for an “armed 
attack” to occur or be imminent in the 
traditional sense to lawfully use force in 
self-defense?
This extension of the principle 
of self-defense stretches traditional 
understandings of sovereignty, but the 
second strand of counterterrorism-
based arguments justifying the use of 
force does, however, reflect a deep shift 
in understandings. 
The argument comes into sharpest 
focus when we consider drone strikes 
and other cross-border uses of force 
outside of “hot” battlefields. Since 
2011, the United States has repeat-
edly used force inside the borders 
of sovereign states with which we are 
not at war, at times without the con-
sent of the affected state. In October 
2008, for instance, U.S. troops in Iraq 
crossed the Syrian and attacked targets 
inside Syria.13 The United States has 
also attacked targets inside Pakistan, 
Yemen, and Somalia. In some cases, 
the affected states have consented to the 
United States’ use of force. In other 
cases, their consent is, at best, ques-
tionable.14 
While the United States has been 
reluctant to offer much detail or legal 
justification for these actions, the logic 
used appears structurally identical to 
that embraced by the human rights and 
humanitarian law communities: sover-
eignty implies responsibilities as well as 
rights; states must refrain from internal 
acts that threaten the citizens or basic 
security of other states, and must pre-
vent non-state entities from engaging 
in such acts inside their borders.  If 
a state fails to fulfill this responsibil-
ity—by, for instance, harboring ter-
Counterterrorism concerns sparked the 
rapid emergence of both normative and legal 
arguments for expanding the basis for using 
force within the territory of other states.
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rorists—other states are entitled to use 
force within its borders if doing so 
is necessary to protect themselves or 
uphold global security.15 As President 
Obama’s chief counterterrorism advi-
sor John Brennan stated in a 2011 
speech, “We reserve the right to take 
unilateral action if or when other gov-
ernments are unwilling or unable to 
take the necessary actions themselves.”16 
A Strange Convergence. The 
human rights and national security dis-
courses appear to have converged on 
structurally parallel sovereignty-limit-
ing theories—though neither commu-
nity is entirely comfortable with the 
logical implications taken for granted 
by the other community. 
One might even say that the R2P coin 
ought logically to be seen as having two 
sides. On one side lies a state’s duty to 
take action inside its own territory to 
protect its own population from violence 
and atrocities. On the other side lies a 
state’s duty to take action inside its own 
territory to protect other states’ populations 
from violence. Either way, a state that 
fails in these duties faces the prospect 
that other states will intervene in its 
“internal” affairs without its consent.17   
There is a substantial irony here: 
human rights advocates and counter-
terrorism hawks make strange bedfel-
lows. The “hard security” community, 
historically realist in its orientation, 
tends to be uncomfortable with the 
notion that states have a responsibil-
ity to protect the populations of other 
states from atrocities. The emerging 
R2P doctrine has largely been greeted 
in national security law quarters as 
irrelevant or pernicious, likely to draw 
the United States into diversionary for-
eign entanglements at the expense of 
protecting our core national security 
interests. 
Meanwhile, those in the human 
rights community are even more sus-
picious of the hard security discourse, 
often finding the actions it enables 
repugnant. To many in the human 
rights and humanitarian legal commu-
nities, drone strikes and other uses of 
force outside of “hot” battlefields are 
seen as little more than extra-territo-
rial, extrajudicial executions—a flagrant 
violation of international human rights 
and rule of law principles.
Yet the logic of each sovereignty-
limiting theory is virtually identical, 
and each theory serves to legitimize the 
other, though neither the human rights 
community nor the national securi-
ty community tends to want fully to 
acknowledge this.  
Whether the potential use of force is 
justified on counterterrorism grounds 
or on humanitarian and human rights 
grounds, the potential for a slippery 
slope is apparent. Those who would 
justify either human rights-based inter-
ventions or counterterrorism-based 
interventions should face precisely the 
The human rights and national security 
discourses appear to have converged on struc-
turally parallel sovereignty-limiting theories.
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same set of questions: Who gets to judge 
when a state should be deemed to have 
“waived” its sovereignty and abrogated 
its responsibilities? Who gets to decide 
when a use of force inside the border of 
a non-consenting state is lawful? And 
which actors get to use force? A single 
state acting unilaterally? Regional orga-
nizations? Coalitions of the willing? 
If each state claims the right to judge 
for itself when force can be used inside 
the borders of another state, the world 
may become an even more frightening 
and unstable place, given the continued 
weakness of most existing international 
institutions. Indeed, we risk a return to 
the Hobbesian international order the 
UN Charter was designed to eliminate. 
This should trouble us—and it may 
be particularly troubling for those in 
the human rights community. After all, 
it is the human rights community that 
has traditionally been most concerned 
with the integrity and normative value 
of international law and institutions. 
Those in the national security com-
munity may be inclined to take a less 
apocalyptic view on the theory that the 
Hobbesian world order has been with 
us all along.
Yet, these sovereignty-limiting 
theories emerge for compelling rea-
sons, and reflect changed facts on the 
ground. Sometimes states engage in 
such egregious atrocities against their 
own populations that morality, if not 
law, appears to demand a response. 
Sometimes states will be unwilling or 
unable to take action against dangerous 
terrorist groups operating inside their 
borders—and in an age in which tech-
nologies, money, people and materiel 
can cross borders rapidly and easily, 
it seems unreasonable to expect other 
states, if threatened, to stand idly by. 
The clock cannot be turned back.
What is to be done? The dilemmas 
created by current sovereignty-limiting 
doctrines are clear. It is less clear, how-
ever, what our response should be. Two 
possible approaches exist.
First, of course, we might view this 
as a call to get serious about addressing 
the international rule of law problems 
created by current sovereignty-limiting 
doctrines, and begin the long, difficult 
project of developing alternate forms of 
restraint and accountability. We might 
focus, for instance, on trying to create 
a more responsive and representative 
Security Council, one less likely to be 
paralyzed by ideology and less vulner-
able to charges of partiality and self-
interest. 
Alternatively, we might seek to create 
or adapt international judicial insti-
tutions to serve as a check on uses of 
force: we might develop an interna-
tional legal or normative framework 
requiring states that wish to use force 
for humanitarian or counterterrorism 
reasons to seek prior (or retroactive) 
approval from some relatively “objec-
tive” international judicial or quasi-
judicial body.
None of these projects would be 
straightforward; each might be seen as 
facing barriers so high as to be virtually 
insurmountable. If the various institu-
tional and legal “fixes” we might envi-
sion are unrealistic in the near term, is 
there any responsible way forward?
The overall thrust of this essay has 
been to call for intellectual honesty 
about the logical implications of emerg-
ing sovereignty-limiting doctrines. But, 
perhaps, this is one of those areas where 
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discretion—even disingenuousness—is 
the better part of valor, or at least the 
better part of preserving stability. 
Stephen Krasner makes a variant of 
this argument in some of his recent 
work. Krasner famously dubbed sov-
ereignty “organized hypocrisy,” noting 
that while the notion of “sovereign-
ty” has long been associated with clear 
legal criteria and rules, states have, for 
just as long, routinely ignored those 
rules when it suited them to do so.18 
To Krasner, this organized hypocrisy 
is nonetheless functional—or at least 
more functional than any available 
alternative.
In a 2010 essay on “The Durabil-
ity of Organized Hypocrisy,” Krasner 
argues that this remains true today.19 He 
grants that emerging normative or legal 
doctrines will continue to challenge 
and delegitimize traditional notions of 
sovereignty, and significant “shocks”—
such as “the possibility of mega-ter-
rorist attacks”—might lead to radical 
change: “Governments in advanced 
countries would begin to reconfig-
ure their bureaucratic structures to…
[reflect] new rules and principles about 
responsibilities for territories or func-
tions beyond national borders.” 
But, argues Krasner, “Such funda-
mental challenges to the existing sover-
eignty regime are not to be welcomed. 
Any new set of principles…would be 
contested. External actors, even if their 
claims were legitimated…would not 
find it easy to exercise the authority they 
had asserted…there are no formulaic 
solutions.” Krasner concludes, “Sov-
ereignty has worked very imperfectly 
but it has still worked better than any 
other structure that decision-makers 
have been able to envision.”20 
In other words: in the end, per-
haps, when it comes to teasing out the 
implications of emerging sovereignty-
limiting doctrines, organized hypocrisy 
is the best we can do. 
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